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RESUMEN
ABSTRACT
Este problema que se discute hoy es importante porque la cuestión de los resultados de la política 
exterior de Rusia en el siglo XVIII es aún discutible en la historiografía rusa contemporánea. Esta 
discusión está conectada con la preservación en las mentes de la sociedad rusa de una actitud 
ambivalente hacia el crecimiento territorial del Imperio ruso en este siglo. Una parte de la 
sociedad acoge con satisfacción este crecimiento, que ha permitido a Rusia llegar a los mares. 
Otra parte de la sociedad indica las grandes pérdidas humanas y financieras que el país ha sufrido 
como resultado de la expansión. Un objetivo del artículo es relacionar los objetivos establecidos 
por la elite rusa con las guerras y los resultados logrados. El enfoque principal para el estudio de 
este problema se ha convertido en un método científico general de análisis y síntesis. El artículo 
describe los objetivos que los gobernantes de Rusia se fijaron antes del comienzo de varias 
guerras. Caracteriza los resultados de esas guerras. Evalúa la efectividad de las guerras basándose 
en la correlación de los resultados, que se lograron, con los objetivos establecidos. Revela las 
tendencias en el desarrollo de esta efectividad. Los materiales del artículo pueden ser útiles para 
aclarar las ideas sobre la política exterior del Imperio ruso en el siglo XVIII.?
PaLabRas CLaVE: Rusia, Guerra del Norte, Guerra de los siete años, secciones de 
Rzeczpospolita, guerras ruso-turcas, “proyecto griego”.
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This problem being discussed is important today because the issue of the results of Russia’s 
foreign policy in the eighteenth century is still debatable in contemporary Russian historiography. 
This discussion is connected with the preservation in the minds of Russian society of an 
ambivalent attitude towards the territorial growth of the Russian Empire in this century. a part 
of the society welcomes this growth, which has allowed Russia to reach the seas. another part of 
the society indicates the great human and financial losses that the country has suffered as a 
result of expansion. a goal of the article is to relate the goals set by the Russian elite to the wars 
and the results achieved. The leading approach to the study of this problem has become a general 
scientific method of analysis and synthesis. The article describes the goals that the rulers of 
Russia set for themselves before the beginning of various wars. It characterizes the results of 
those wars. It assesses the effectiveness of the wars based on the correlation of the results, which 
were achieved, with the goals set. It reveals the trends in the development of this effectiveness. 
The materials of the article can be useful for clarifying the ideas about the foreign policy of the 
Russian Empire in the eighteenth century.
KEy wORds: Russia, Northern war, the seven years’ war, sections of Rzeczpospolita, Russian-
Turkish wars, “Greek project”. 
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The history of imperial Russia was full of 
wars. a special place was occupied by the 
eighteenth century. In that century Russia 
conducted the largest number of wars com-
pared to the other centuries of its history. The 
Russian state had been at war for fourty eight 
years in the eighteenth century.
Russia came to two seas important for tra-
de with Europe - the black sea and the baltic 
sea. Russia liquidated its western neighbor, 
Rzeczpospolita, against which Russia had 
fought in the 17th century for 23 years. Rus-
sia became a full-fledged participant in the 
European system of international relations, 
and in some periods played a major role in 
it. These achievements are undeniable. They 
are analyzed in detail in the Russian histo-
rical studies in which the course of the wars 
of Russia with its adversaries and diplomatic 
relations between Russia and the European 
countries are described. However, most stu-
dies lack a generalized view of Russia’s mili-
tary success, combined with the tasks set by 
the Russian elite before the wars. Meanwhile, 
a quantitative analysis of the wars of Russia 
in this aspect would fill a gap in the scientific 
historical views on the effectiveness of Rus-
sia’s foreign policy. This article is devoted to 
the analysis of wars of Russia from this angle 
of view.
The system-structural approach has provi-
ded an opportunity to characterize compre-
hensively the research of the contemporary 
Russian historians in order to identify some-
thing common and unique in two aspects. 
First, to analyze the goals and tasks set be-
fore the wars started by the Russian elite. 
second, to compare the achievements of the 
Russian army summarizing the results of the 
wars and peace treaties with those plans. The 
problem-chronological approach has made 
it possible to divide the analyzed area into a 
number of specific problems and to characte-
rize them separately, but in interrelation with 
the other problems. The application of the 
comparative-historical method has made it 
possible to compare and collate the goals and 
outcomes of the various wars.
The goals of Russia before the wars can be 
conditionally divided into small, large and 
grandiose. at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century Peter I set a goal to reach the baltic 
sea, but he wanted only to return to the small 
coastline of the Gulf of Finland, which Rus-
sia lost in the treaty of stolbovo with sweden 
in 1618. Perter did not even dream about at-
taching the entire baltics at the very begin-
ning of the Northern war with sweden, and 
was ready to cede it to Rzeczpospolita and 
saxony - the allies of Russia in the war. as 
Russia progressed in the Northern war, Pe-
ter’s ambitions grew, and he set a new goal: to 
acquire the entire southern coast of the Gulf 
of Finland (Estonia and Ingria) with the large 
seaports of Narva and Revel. and when the 
Russian army occupied in 1710 the entire bal-
tics (including Liflandia with the large port of 
Riga), Peter already set a goal to consolidate 
all of it legally behind Russia [N. Pavlenko, 
1998]. He succeeded. The result of the Nor-
thern war was the consolidation of the baltics 
and even parts of the Finnish lands belonging 
to sweden (with the fortress of Vyborg) be-
hind Russia. (Xiangyi et al., 2016 and Ling et 
al., 2016) Thus, the grandiose results achieved 
by Peter the Great in the baltic direction far 
surpassed the originally set small goal. The 
unexpected result of the Northern war, not 
planned by Peter in any of the purposes, was 
the establishment of Russia’s protectorate over 
Rzeczpospolita. according to the decisions of 
the “mute seym” Rzeczpospolita’s army was 
reduced to a paltry extent, the Russian army 
could freely pass through the territory of this 
state, and Rzeczpospolita itself entered into 
an alliance with Russia. an opposite example 
(a grandiose goal and a negative result) was 
the Prut campaign of Peter I on the Ottoman 
Empire in 1711. Peter counted on appearance 
of the Russian troops in the balkans to rai-
se the slavic peoples to а liberation struggle 
against the Ottoman Turks. The ultimate goal 
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was appearance in the balkans of the slavic 
states independent and friendly towards Rus-
sia (serbia, bulgaria). Nothing came out of it. 
The Russian army was surrounded by Turki-
sh troops and barely got out of it at the price 
of concessions from Peter. Russia gave Tur-
key the fortress of azov, which it won in 1696 
[N. Pavlenko, 1998]. The balance between the 
goal and result was the Persian campaign of 
Peter I in 1722-1723. His goal was to seize the 
western and southern coast of the Caspian 
sea which was achieved. Iran gave Russia the 
southern shore of the Caspian sea. Howe-
ver, the economic goal (Mafi et al. 2012) of 
that campaign – to turn the flow of eastern 
goods from asia to the Caspian sea and send 
it through Russia to the baltic sea, and then 
to Europe – was not achieved [ I. Kurukin, 
2010]. The last goal of Peter which he set in 
1723 – to win a seat in the world Ocean with 
the help of the baltic Fleet, in order to have 
colonies too and to rise level with the colonial 
European powers (Holland, England, France, 
spain) – was not achieved due to Peter’s dea-
th in 1725. The successors of Peter refused 
such grandiose intentions.
Reign of anna Ioannovna. at the beginning 
of her reign, Russia had a problem of keeping 
Rzeczpospolita under its protectorate, where 
anti-Russian sentiments grew and the Polish 
aristocrat stanislav Leszczynski was elected 
without the consent of Russia. anna set a goal 
to restore Russian control over Rzeczpospoli-
ta. That was achieved following the results of 
the war for “Polish inheritance” in 1733-1735. 
Leshchinsky fled from Poland, and with the 
consent of Russia the saxon elector august 
III came to its throne. He confirmed the de-
cisions of the “silent seym”. Rzeczpospolita 
remained under the protectorate of Russia 
[I. Kurukin, 2014]. The goal and the result 
in that case completely coincided. a big goal 
and an insignificant, although positive result 
was the results of the Russian-Turkish war of 
1735-1739. The goal was to conquer the Cri-
mea and destruct the Crimean Khanate, as 
well as get an access to the black sea on the 
vast Crimean coast. Nothing came out of it. 
during the war the Russian army also ente-
red the Moldavian principality (it was a vassal 
of the Ottoman Empire). The commander of 
the Russian army b. Minich had a goal of at-
tachment it to Russia, but this required the 
consent of anna Ioannovna, she never gave 
it. The Russian army left Moldova. according 
to the belgrade peace of 1739 with Turkey, 
Russia received only the fortress of the azov 
without a right to fortify it with fortifications 
[N. Petrukhintsev, 2014].
Reign of Elizabeth Petrovna. at the begin-
ning of her reign Russia had a problem – swe-
den attacked Russia, seeking to take revenge 
for the defeat in the Northern war and re-
gain at least some part of the lands taken by 
Russia. as soon as Elizabeth came to power, 
she set a goal to preserve all the lands in pos-
session of Russia. The goal was slightly over-
fulfilled. The result of the Russian-swedish 
war of 1741-1743 was the treaty of abos, ac-
cording to which Russia seized from sweden 
a little more territory in Finland. The border 
with sweden was moved away from st. Peter-
sburg to the Kymmene river [F.-d. Liechten-
han, 2007].
The seven years’ war of 1756-1763. That 
war is an example, when two goals were set: 
insignificant and unclear. during the war the 
Russian leadership changed them into one 
purpose – a larger one. but in the end Russia 
achieved absolutely nothing. The goal of re-
ducing Prussia’s influence in Europe was un-
clear, as its King Frederick the Great was lea-
ding an unpredictable aggressive policy that 
could affect the influence of Russia in Rzec-
zpospolita (Prussia bordered on it). However, 
the entourage of Elizabeth Petrovna could 
not determine what exactly it was to decrease 
that influence. The aim to take the province 
East Prussia from Prussia and hand it over to 
Rzeczpospolita was insignificant. and Rzec-
zpospolita was supposed to hand over its 
eastern lands to Russia, bordering with Rus-
sia – Eastern belorussia. already during the 
war the Russian leadership set a goal to keep 
East Prussia for itself, since on its territory 
there was a large port of Königsberg [M.yu. 
anisimov, 2014]. but as a result, Elizabeth Pe-
trovna died without waiting for a victorious 
peace with Prussia. Coming to power, Peter 
III, who was a fan of Prussia, returned East 
Prussia for free. Peter III was overthrown by 
Catherine II in six months’ time, but she de-
cided not to resume the war to return that 
territory back under the Russian rule, as the 
Russian budget was undermined by the costly 
war. as a result, Russia was left with nothing.
Reign of Catherine II. The first war of Ca-
therine was the war with the Ottoman Empire 
in 1768-1774. Catherine set a goal to achieve 
an access to the black sea. The achieved re-
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sults surpassed by far the set goals. according 
to the treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca of 1774, Rus-
sia got a direct access to the black sea between 
the dnieper and the southern bug rivers, but 
small in length. In addition, Russia received 
the fortresses Kerch and yenikale in Crimea, 
the possession of which allowed the Russian 
ships to pass freely the Kerch strait from the 
azov sea to the black sea. In addition, the 
Crimean Khanate was declared independent 
of the Ottoman Empire, what created prere-
quisites for its liquidation and attachment of 
Crimea to Russia. In 1783 that was done [E.K. 
de ankoss, 2002]. The Russian army entered 
Crimea. In addition, Russia was given a ri-
ght to patronize the danubian principalities 
(Moldavia and wallachia), previously com-
pletely dependent on Turkey. However, in the 
course of that war, austria and Prussia took 
advantage of Russia, being busy with the mili-
tary actions with Turkey, who decided to seize 
some lands from Rzeczpospolita. Catherine 
did not want to give them anything and her 
goal was to keep Rzeczpospolita as it was and 
under the Russian protectorate. she failed. 
Catherine had to settle for the first parcelling 
of Rzeczpospolita, and agree to transfer the 
Polish lands, neighboring to them, towards 
Prussia and austria. For Russia, Catherine 
took East belorussia from Rzeczpospolita [P. 
stegniy, 2002]. after that Catherine became 
ready for «Greek project» - a grandiose idea 
about attachment of the balkan possessions 
of the Ottoman empire to Russia and their 
division with the austrian empire. That goal 
became main during the war with Turkey in 
1787-1791. However, in the course of that war 
sweden attacked Russia, and Catherine had 
to waste her time and energy for a fight with 
sweden. The set goal to defeat sweden quickly 
was achieved in a short time - in 1788-1790. 
according to the Treaty of werala Russia did 
not lose anything, but nothing was received 
from sweden. The status quo was preserved. 
but during the Russian-Turkish war Prussia 
decided again to take away the lands, profita-
ble for itself, from Rzeczpospolita. after the 
first parcelling of Rzeczpospolita Catherine II 
set a goal by all means to preserve the territory 
remaining in the possession of that state un-
der the Russian influence. but because of the 
war with Turkey Catherine did not go to esca-
lation of the conflict with Prussia, and agreed 
to the second parcelling of Rzeczpospolita in 
1793. and Catherine’s «Greek project» re-
mained a pipedream. according to the Jass 
world of 1791, Russia achieved Turkey’s con-
firmation regarding possession of Crimea and 
attached the small black sea coastline from 
the yuzhny bug River to the dniester River. 
The results achieved by Catherine in that war 
contrasted sharply with her initial grandiose 
plans. Meanwhile, the national liberation mo-
vement was raised in remaining Rzeczpospo-
lita after being parceled twice. In May 1791 
the Constitution was adopted, reinforcing the 
royal power and in fact liquidating the Rus-
sian protectorate. The Polish army was crea-
ted. The Russian emprire encountered a new 
problem. Catherine II, as well as Prussia and 
austria, set a goal not to let the strong Poli-
sh state reborn and in 1795 they went on the 
third parcelling of Rzeczpospolita. The result 
was achieved by Russia in the shortest possi-
ble time - the Russian army led by alexander 
suvorov stormed warsaw, the Poles fought 
desperately, but then surrendered and were 
exiled to siberia [I. de Madariaga, 1982]. That 
result was quite consistent with the goal. at 
the end of the reign Catherine set a goal to 
crush the revolution in France in 1789-1794, 
having returned the power of the French aris-
tocracy and the bourbon dynasty. but she was 
prevented by death to achieve that result.
Reign of Paul I. Paul I decided to fight not 
with the French revolution, but with its spread 
throughout Europe. Therefore, he decided to 
help austria to knock out the French troops 
from Northern Italy, where the Russian army 
went headed by a. suvorov. suvorov achieved 
a brilliant result. The northern Italian sta-
tes were liberated from the French. The only 
thing was that Russia got nothing out of it. 
but then Paul quarreled with England. The 
English fleet captured the island of Malta, 
where Order of Malta was located, the mas-
ter of which Paul had recently become. Paul 
demanded that Malta be cleared, but England 
did not do so. Paul set a grand goal to puni-
sh England for that refusal. He concluded an 
alliance with France and decided to send the 
Russian army on a campaign against India in 
alliance with the French troops. India was the 
main English colony, which brought tremen-
dous profits to England, and invasion of India 
by the Russian army could greatly frighten the 
English. but Paul did not achieve that goal. He 
was overthrown by alexander (his son), who 
abolished the Indian campaign.
The problem of the effectiveness of Russia’s 
foreign policy in the eighteenth century is 
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mainly regarded in the Russian historiogra-
phy with an emphasis on its achievements. 
N. Pavlenko positively assesses Russia’s fo-
reign policy in the first quarter of the eigh-
teenth century . Russia’s policy is assessed 
as balanced [“From the kingdom to the em-
pire. Russia in the systems of international 
relations. 2015]. although we can note the 
growth of critical assessment of Russia’s ac-
tions. I. Kurukin assesses the actions of Pe-
ter I and anna Ioannovna as noneffective . 
N. Petrukhintsev is in agreement with him . 
In the foreign historiography Russia’s actions 
against Rzeczpospolita are assessed as “impe-
rialist claims” [N. aleksiun, d. beauvois, M.-
E. ducreux, J. Kloczowski, H. samsonowicz, 
P. wandycz, 2004]. However, d. Lieven and 
E.K. de ankoss, who believe that Russia’s ac-
tions were conditioned by specific foreign-po-
licy circumstances, do not agree with this [d. 
Lieven, 2002;7]. F.-d. Liechtenhan ,and in the 
Russian historiography M.yu. anisimov stick 
to a similar point of view, only with regard 
to Russia’s participation in the seven years’ 
war. The foreign policy of Russia under Ca-
therine II as corresponding to the national 
interests of the country is characterized by I. 
de Madariaga and P. stegniy .
In general, only in two cases out of 13 (the 
Northern war and the war with Turkey in 
1768-1774) the achieved results in Russia’s 
foreign policy in the eighteenth century sur-
passed by far the set goals. However, this is an 
exception to the general trend, which is repre-
sented by the following. In 6 out of 13 cases 
(conflicts and wars) the results corresponded 
to the goals set. Russia achieved exactly what 
its elite wanted, but did not want to achieve 
more or was not able to. what is more, in 4 
cases out of those 6 Russia successfully co-
ped with unexpectedly emerging threats. but 
in 5 cases the result was inadequately small 
compared to the big and even grandiose goals 
set (receipt of azov according to the Treaty of 
belgrade in 1739), the zero one (seven years’ 
war) or even the negative one (loss of azov 
in Prut campaign of 1711). we should add 
3 more cases to these 13 when the big goals 
were not realized because of the death of the 
rulers of Russia. In the first case Peter I did 
not have time to see the Russian fleet in the 
world Ocean. In the second case Catherine II 
did not have time to enter her army into Pa-
ris. In the third case Paul I did not have time 
to see the Cossacks in India. The successors 
of all three deceased rulers forgot about those 
goals.
In general, when any state in the eighteen-
th century created a threat to Russia, then 
Russia successfully coped with those threats. 
The goal to reflect an emerging threat was 
achieved rather quickly and without spen-
ding big for the country. when it was Russia 
that wanted to create threats to any country, 
then Russia, as a rule, failed. a set goal was 
not achieved. Two exceptions in the form of 
the Treaties of Nystad and Kucuk Kaynarca 
only confirm this consistent pattern.
The work is performed according to the 
Russian Government Program of Competiti-
ve Growth of Kazan Federal University.
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